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ABSTRACT
Enabling Real-Time Wireless Channel Based Encryption Key Generation
Brandon Z. Katz
Advisor: Kapil R. Dandekar, Ph.D.
As the demand for wireless communication grows, so does the need for wireless security.
Through both high profile attacks as well as personal identity theft at open access points,
it has been demonstrated that security is falling behind the curve. Wireless consumers cre-
ate weak passwords, forget to turn on the latest encryption, and connect to open wireless
networks every day. One solution is to remove the human element and instead generate
encryption keys on the fly. Recently, methods have been proposed to use wireless channels
as common entropy sources to enable radios to generate symmetric encryption keys. These
techniques rely on the unique wireless environment between two radios in order to effec-
tively move security down to the physical layer of a radio network as opposed to requiring
users to handle encryption keys directly. In this thesis, a method of generating keys using
wireless channels in real-time through additions to the IEEE 802.11 protocol is described
and validated. As part of the process, a technique for sampling wireless channels using ap-
plication layer traffic is designed and tested. Additionally, major related points of interest
such as channel coherence, bit error handling, and real-time processing, are discussed.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The ever increasing role that wireless devices play in everyday life allows information to flow
faster than ever. From messages to loved ones, sensitive banking information, and critical
medical monitoring, much personal information travels through the air at some point on its
journey. While this wireless revolution has added daily convenience and improved overall
quality of life for millions of people, it has also created new vulnerabilities that were unheard
of just twenty years ago.
Wireless security always seems to be one step behind wireless intruders. Many networks
are completely open, and outdated encryption techniques are still commonly used. These
deficiencies allow the theft of personal data and make illegal eavesdropping quick and easy
to implement.
One major commonality between existing encryption schemes is the use of pre-shared
secret keys or the use of a public key system. While pre-shared keys can be strengthened
through the use of longer and more random keys, they are susceptible to man-in-the-middle
and eavesdropping-style attacks. In common home network security schemes, where the
user has input to the key generation process, networks also become vulnerable to simple
brute-force-style attacks due to weak passphrases. Still, despite our best data security
efforts, we also often encounter unsecured wireless networks in public places.
One potential solution to the stated attacks, and even the public network problem, is to
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move the encryption key life-cycle down to the physical layer of communications networks
from key generation and distribution through data encryption. This research began in the
early 1990s with investigations into extracting mutual secret information from correlated
random variables. As wireless channels are naturally random (yet can be correlated under
certain circumstances) [1], some information theoretic studies turned towards using wireless
channels between two radios as a shared entropy source. By the early 2000s, researchers were
looking at the experimental aspects of channel based encryption key generation using very
controlled testbeds, and as a result the popular ‘Radio-Telepathy’ algorithm was introduced
[2]. While new algorithms were developed to extract bits from wireless channels [3], very
little progress was made on transitioning the technology towards widely adopted systems.
In this thesis, one facet of physical layer security, channel based symmetric encryption
key generation, will be investigated. Specifically, this thesis aims to:
• Design, construct, and verify a proof of concept real-time channel based key generation
system
• Formulate a technique to sample wireless channels using existing information from
application layer communications building on work presented in [4].
In order to accomplish these goals, first, a background of wireless security techniques
and foundations of Physical (PHY) layer key generation will be given in chapter 2. Next,
a novel technique for sampling wireless channels with minimal overhead will be developed
in chapter 3. The discussed sampling technique will then be incorporated into one of the
first real-time PHY layer key generation systems in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will cover how
the sampling technique and real-time system were implemented for experimentation while
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results are presented along with discussion in chapter 6. Finally, conclusions will be drawn
and recommendations for future work put forward in chapter 7.
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this chapter, an introduction to wireless security will be provided following the evolution
of the IEEE 802.11 standard. Next, potential existing solutions to deficiencies will be
brought to light. The concept of physical layer security will be presented, followed by a
brief discussion of wireless channels. Finally, the idea of using wireless channels to generate
encryption keys will be presented.
2.1 Modern Wireless Security
The modern exchange of information over wireless networks poses security challenges never
dreamt of by early wireless pioneers. As the IEEE 802.11 standard is used as a test system
throughout this thesis, a brief overview of 802.11 security mechanisms is provided here.
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was the security standard introduced with 802.11 in 1997
[5]. WEP used the Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stream cipher for encryption key generation
which was simply XORed with plaintext. While an Initialization Vector (IV) was included
in WEP to keep the cipher from repeating, weak IV generation undermined much of the
effort. Overall, WEP was broken within four years of its introduction [6]. Multiple research
groups have shown that WEP keys can be discovered through capturing over the air traffic
for less than one minute. Once known, the key can be used to decrypt all traffic. Even
today, WEP security continues to plague 802.11 networks as many legacy systems still use
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it as their primary security method.
In 2004, WEP was deprecated with the 802.11i amendment [7]. In its place, WiFi
Protected Access (WPA) was introduced as a more secure option than WEP, which could
be applied with a software upgrade to existing hardware. While WPA still used the RC4
stream cipher, it improved encryption through the use of what is known as the Temporal
Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). TKIP helps to randomize keys through the use of a hashing
function before using them to seed RC4, allowing each packet to be encrypted with a unique
key. Despite the improvements offered by WPA with TKIP, keys were easily broken when
users used short passphrases. In addition, TKIP is vulnerable to packet insertion through
a time consuming, but usable, attack [8], [9].
In order to remove the weakness caused by the RC4 cipher, the 802.11i amendment
introduced the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. This part of
the amendment, called WiFi Protected Access Second Generation (WPA2) by the indus-
try, required hardware changes and was meant to complete the security overhaul started
with WPA-TKIP. The use of AES instead of RC4 makes WPA2 a much stronger security
mechanism than previous solutions, and as a result WPA2 is now the only non-deprecated
802.11 security mechanism as of 2012 [10]. WPA2 can operate in a ‘personal’ mode which
utilizes a Pre-Shared Key (PSK) between the Access Point (AP) and each Station (STA) on
the network for both authentication and encryption. In addition, WPA2 can operate in an
‘enterprise’ mode which utilizes a centralized key server for authentication and encryption
key distribution.
The use of PSK in 802.11 networks presents a vulnerability to dictionary attacks where
malicious parties guess weak passphrases in order to decrypt all future packets [11]. In
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addition, users can be forced off the network with deauthentication attacks and the four-way
handshake used for reauthentication can be observed in order to decrypt all traffic between
the AP and that particular STA. Today, these vulnerabilities can be easily exploited using
hobbyist tools such as the WiFi Pineapple, an open source 802.11 penetration tester, which
costs less than $100 [12]. The WiFi Pineapple incorporates a multitude of free software in
order to gain access to 802.11 networks. In addition, the device is extensible with room for
new attacks against standards that have not yet been written.
2.2 Current Security Solutions
The 802.11 set of standards rely on pre-shared passphrases used to encrypt and decrypt data
using symmetric key cryptography algorithms. A pre-shared passphrase can be referred
to as a shared secret between nodes that must be distributed before they can securely
communicate. Secret pre-sharing presents core vulnerabilities in security systems from
users picking weak passwords that can be easily guessed, to keys getting intercepted during
the sharing process. The current major solution to the problem of having to pre-share secret
keys is to use asymmetric cryptography, otherwise known as public key cryptography. In
public key cryptography, a user (Alice) generates two keys in such a fashion that one
key (the public key) can be used to encrypt data and only the second key (the private
key) can decrypt information that was encrypted by the first key. In this type of system,
Alice publishes the public encryption key for all other users to see using open channels
(unencrypted communication links). This public key is then used by another user (Bob)
to pass a secret message to Alice by encrypting his message using Alice’s public encryption
key. Bob then proceeds to send his encrypted message over an open channel to Alice. Only
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Alice can decrypt the data sent by Bob as it was encrypted using the encryption key that
Alice generated. These types of systems can also be used to generate a shared secret using
insecure communications.
Two common algorithms enabling this type encryption are the RSA Cryptosystem [13],
used to generate public and private keys, and the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, used to
generate a shared secret over an insecure medium. The basis of these techniques is the idea
that each user can generate a personal secret, perform some operation on their personal
secret enabling them to transmit it to the other user, and then each user can combine their
personal secret with the transmitted information to generate a shared secret that is unique
and cannot be generated using the publicly transmitted information.
A potential flaw in these types of algorithms is their assumption of computational hard-
ness. This means that the shared secrets that these algorithms are used to generate can
not be computed with the publicly available information because to do so would be very
difficult, so difficult that current algorithms and technology are not enough to solve the
problem in a useful amount of time (i.e. it would take many, many years to figure out
the secret information from the publicly available information). In the Diffie-Hellman ap-
proach, there is an assumption that it is very hard to compute certain discrete logarithms
[14]. Similarly, in the RSA approach, there is an assumption of computational hardness
related to the prime factorization of large integers [15]. The problem is, it is possible that
these computationally hard problems may be overcome in the future through the discov-
ery of more advanced algorithms and/or more computing power. In addition, some argue
that the generally accepted assumptions of computational hardness are not necessarily the
weakest assumptions that these algorithms rely on [16]. If these fundamental assumptions
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are proven to be easier to solve than current knowledge indicates, then these encryption
techniques that are integral to internet security would be invalidated.
More worrisome, especially in the short term, are poor implementations of these algo-
rithms. In the mid 1990s, researches discovered that by timing how long it takes to perform
certain key operations, critical cryptosystem parameters can be extracted that allow de-
cryption of ciphertext [17]. Proposed solutions include taking action to ensure timing is
somewhat random by adding extraneous information to data during encryption. Recently,
it has come to light that most implementations of the Diffie-Hellman technique use a small
subset of possible constant prime numbers. This creates a problem because, instead of
reversing the process to gain the shared secret (which is assumed to be very hard), many
possible combinations of the process can be forward calculated using existing computa-
tional resources [18]. Researchers with limited resources have demonstrated the attack on
512 bit numbers and it is likely that state sponsored agencies can perform the attack on
1024 bit numbers with current resources. This problem can be temporarily overcome by
using 2048 bit numbers, but increasing the size of primes also increases encryption time; this
workaround may be overcome in the future with increased computing power. Finally, all of
these security algorithms rely on pseudo-random number generators to produce their private
algorithm components. Any defects in the random number generation process compromises
the entire security system.
While these techniques of communicating secrets over a shared medium in order to form
a secure channel may have some potentially disturbing attacks, they remain strong overall
when used perfectly. Some major commonalities between all of these existing systems are
that they rely on external randomness through some pseudo-random number generator and
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their assumptions of computational hardness. Another class of security systems, denoted
Physical Layer Security, changes these underlying assumptions and sources of randomness in
order to provide more options for multiple aspects system security. Since assumptions may
be proven wrong, and it is always possible to have a flawed security algorithm implemen-
tation, independent security must be implemented in as many network layers as possible.
Physical layer security can be used to add an independent layer of protection at the bottom
of the network stack.
2.3 Physical Layer Security
PHY layer security became a topic of research in the early 1990s. The overall idea is to use
the physical layer of a system to provide security. For wireless systems, this could mean
utilizing directional jamming to block eavesdroppers, using tight beamforming or directional
antennas to help ensure a signal only reaches the intended recipient, or hiding waveform
features such as preambles in 802.11 to disrupt packet interception, among many other
possibilities. This thesis will focus on the generation of encryption keys using the wireless
channel between two radios.
By utilizing wireless channels, the entropy pool becomes the shared secret. This is
useful since wireless channels are known to be random and unique (as described below) and
there is no need for a key distribution system as radios end up with symmetric secret keys.
In addition, using symmetric keys saves some time during the encrypting and decrypting
processes because there is no public/private computation necessary once the initial key is
generated.
In order to describe channel based encryption, a basic understanding of wireless channels
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must be developed. A wireless channel is characterized as the medium through which a
signal travels between the transmitter and receiver in a radio system [19]. These channels
are comprised of the multiple paths in which a wireless signal simultaneously travels between
the transmitter and receiver that are created by objects (or scatterers) in the environment,
such as walls, people, or machinery. These paths change rapidly over time (known as
channel fading) and combine in both constructive and destructive ways, influencing signal
quality at the receiver. The rate of change in the channel fading is directly related to
the Doppler spread of the channel, which is determined by how much physical movement
is occurring, whether by scatterer movement during signal transmission, radio movement
during transmission, or both. Channel fading is taken to be a random process which occurs
between both ends of a radio link [19]. As two radios have access to the same channel, they
share a random process which allows them to generate a shared secret.
2.3.1 Wireless Channel Model
Channel based encryption relies on fundamental properties of wireless channels. In this
section, a brief overview of wireless channels is provided along with a formulation of how
these channels are described for the purposes of channel based security development.
The underlying principle of channel based key generation is the idea that two nodes
can form a shared secret by sampling a shared entropy source at the same time. In this
situation, the wireless channel is taken as the shared source of randomness. The wireless
channel is an appropriate source of entropy as it varies randomly over time and is reciprocal
between two points at a given instant in time for a given frequency. This reciprocity is a
fundamental property of electromagnetic wave propagation [1] and means that two nodes
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can observe the state of the wireless channel and use the mutual information they gather
as a shared secret. In addition, an outside observer would not be able to see the channel
between the two nodes in the system as the wireless channel rapidly decorrelates in space
at distances over half of a wavelength of the carrier frequency.
Typically, the wireless channel is represented as the complex transfer function, H, that
a known signal goes through between two wireless nodes. As H is complex, it can be broken
down as
H = <(H) + j=(H) = hejθ (2.1)
Where h = |H|, the magnitude of the channel transfer function, and θ = ∠H, the phase
of the transfer function. The magnitude of the transfer function influences the amplitude
of a received signal and is generally regarded to exhibit a Rayleigh distribution for typical
wireless communications multipath fading channels while the phase of the transfer function
influences the phase of a received signal and is generally regarded to exhibit a uniform
distribution over the range [0, 2pi] [20]. Instantaneous measures of the channel are generally
referred to as Channel State Information (CSI) in the frequency domain, and as a Channel
Impulse Response (CIR) in the time domain.
Denoting the magnitude of H at time t as h(t), the expression for the received signal at
a radio node through a channel can be written as
y(t) = x(t) ∗ h(t) + η(t) (2.2)
where x(t) is a transmitted signal, and η(t) is independent noise experienced at the receiver,
typically taken as Gaussian noise, and y(t) is the received signal. By using a known probing
signal, two nodes (denoted Alice and Bob) can estimate the channel between them by
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sending the probe signal back and forth. As they cannot send the probes simultaneously,
as that would require a fully duplex system in time and frequency, they must send the
probes one after the other as fast as fast as possible. The channel stability over time
can be characterized by the channel coherence time, Tc. The coherence time is inversely
proportional to the Doppler shift in the received signal caused by motion of the radio or
surrounding environment [21]. Relying on the assumption that both Bob and Alice can
send and receive probe signals faster than the coherence time of their unique channel, the
discrete channel estimates generated by the nodes can be written as
hˆab[n] = h(nT ) + ηb(nT ) (2.3)
hˆba[n] = h(nT ) + ηa(nT ) (2.4)
where hˆab[n] and hˆba[n] represent the estimated channel from Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice
respectively, at sample n with n = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, and h(nT ) represents the actual channel
sampled with period T . In addition, ηa(nT ) and ηb(nT ) represent the independent noise
processes observed at Alice and Bob respectively, due to noise in the receiver as well as
channel variance due to forward and reverse sampling occurring non-instantaneously.
2.3.2 Wireless Channel Based Encryption Key Generation
Wireless channel based encryption key generation research began in the early 1990s with
information-theoretic papers outlining the possibility of using dependent random variables
to generate symmetric keys [22], [23]. In the early 2000s, fully formed, theoretical, key
extraction techniques using the wireless channel were discussed [24].
Multiple key metrics are of the utmost importance to these algorithms. The first metric
is Secret Bit (s-bit) generation rate, the speed at which encryption bits are produced by
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the algorithm. This metric is an important consideration as it impacts how quickly keys
can be generated at the beginning of a session and how quickly they can be refreshed. The
second major metric is s-bit error rate, or how often corresponding bits on opposite ends
of the channel fail to match. The error rate must be kept to a minimum as any one bit
error means the entire key must be discarded, wasting time and resources. A third metric
is mutual key information, or a measure of the advantage held by an eavesdropper. This
is typically measured through examining the mutual information between key generation
participants and eavesdropping observers. While important, mutual key information will
not be evaluated in this thesis.
Current algorithms used for extracting keys from wireless channels differ in their meth-
ods of using the same channel state information. In [2], a method is presented and evaluated
for the generation of encryption keys through the quantization of sampled channel impulse
responses. This method produces a very low s-bit error rate, with a probability of error on
the order of 10−8. However, with the low chance of bit errors comes a low s-bit generation
rate, on the order of 1 secret bit per second. In addition, the tested level-crossing algorithm
requires information to be sent over an unencrypted channel in order to generate the final
key. In [3], Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) channel estimates are
compared by subcarrier index, thereby comparing many narrowband channels instead of
one wideband channel from each probe. While this method has a very high s-bit generation
rate (on the order of 1,000 secret bits per second), and does not require the transmission of
algorithm data over an unencrypted link, it has a relatively high error rate (on the order of
10−2). One major commonality between these demonstrated algorithms is the use of dedi-
cated channel probes. These probing packets require specific coordination and also take up
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channel capacity. An overview of the cited algorithms can be found in section 4.1.
CHAPTER 3: WIRELESS CHANNEL SAMPLING
In order to perform channel based encryption key generation, radios must have some way
to sample the wireless channel between them. Traditionally, experimental key generation
implementations have employed explicit channel probes with precise timing enabling them
to perform symmetric channel estimation [2], [3], [25]. Dedicated channel probes are used in
sampling as they can be tightly timed in order to sample the channel while it is reciprocal.
Usable reciprocity is generally maintained for a short period of time, often less than the
coherence time of the channel. The coherence time is dependent on the environment and
may range from tens of milliseconds to hundreds of milliseconds [26].
3.1 Effect of Sampling on Reciprocity
As it is impossible for two radios to sample a channel centered on one frequency at exactly
the same time, measured reciprocity in the channel can never be perfect. Despite this, tight
probe timing can allow measurements to get very close to representing the ideal reciprocity
in a channel [27].
Continuing the channel model between two radios, Alice and Bob, developed in section
2.3.1, the sample timing offset in relation to the channel estimates can be expressed as
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channel estimates captured at a constant offset.
hˆab(ta) = hˆba(tb) (3.1)
tb = ta + τ (3.2)
where τ represents a constant offset between the sample times. In order to expose channel
reciprocity, τ must be kept to a minimum.
For encryption key generation, channel sampling that preserves reciprocity is necessary.
In order to quantize symmetric keys, deterministic channel states must be captured before
they change. In addition, long term trends cannot be considered as an adversary then may
be able to take advantage of channel statistics over the long term.
3.2 Application Layer Sampling Description
In this section, a framework for using communications traffic generated by the Application
(APP) layer of a packet based radio system as a means of sampling the wireless channel
is described. The bursty and asymmetric nature of application layer traffic presents a
challenge to two radios sampling the channel symmetrically, as it cannot be assumed that
each received packet directly corresponds to a packet at the other participating radio. This
asymmetry is overcome through the use of an internal timer interrupt on each radio, such
that there is an interrupt approximately once per channel coherence time interval. The
interrupt can be viewed as a request for a packet sample. Once an interrupt occurs, the
next received packet transmitted from a participating radio is used in the channel estimation
process. All other packets should be disregarded for the purpose of sampling the channel,
but should continue through the typical Media Access Control (MAC) pipeline. It should
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be noted that if the interval between received packets on any participating station is greater
than the approximate channel coherence time, the channel sampling process should be put
on hold as the packets used for channel estimation may not be correlated.
Whereas in a traditional probing system there is a small, yet mostly predictable offset
between symmetric channel samples, relying on APP layer traffic makes the process more
stochastic. It must be understood that just because a sample is requested does not mean
that a sample will be available. This changes the timing relation of equation 3.2 by adding
another term, such as
tb = ta + τ
′ (3.3)
where τ ′ represents τ+η and η is a random variable representing the amount of time between
a sample request and sample delivery. The amount of time between sample request and
delivery is dependent on the radio system used, including how it handles radio interference
and the continuous data rate of the traffic being passed. If bi-directional traffic is not
expected but the system uses a packet Acknowledgment (ACK) routine, the ACKs can be
used for sampling as well as data packets.
An illustration of the packet sampling mechanism is shown in Fig. 3.1. In this diagram,
the received packets at a participating radio are shown over time. Note that the diagram is
not to scale. In reality, the duration of a transmitted packet (on the order of microseconds) is
much smaller than a sample window (on the order of milliseconds). To gather approximately
symmetric samples, the process depicted in Fig. 3.1 should run on each participating
receiver.
It is worth noting that in a multi-radio system, the sample request interrupt at each
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receiver will not occur at the exact same time. To fix this, the timer interrupt should be
roughly synchronized across the network when the process begins. Sample requests will not
be at the exact same times due to imperfect synchronizing and timer interrupt variance,
but they should occur within one channel coherence time window, which is fast enough to
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Interrupt
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of APP layer traffic sampling using interrupts
CHAPTER 4: REAL-TIME KEY GENERATION SYSTEM
Until now, channel based encryption algorithms have been evaluated and shown to work
only on experimental testbeds in controlled environments with oﬄine processing [2], [3], [28];
they have not been put to use in real-time, standards-compliant radio networks. Presented
here is the design of a real-time, standard-integrated system for channel based encryption.
This system is considered to be standard-integrated (as opposed to standard-compliant).
While it is not a part of any standard, it can be run within the framework of a standard,
such as IEEE 802.11 provides while allowing for backwards compatibility.
4.1 Physical Layer Key Generation Algorithms
Current channel based key generation algorithms differ mainly in the way that they utilize
channel estimates to produce keys. Two experimentally verified methods are described in
the following sections to illustrate using channel estimate magnitudes directly versus using
channel estimates to examine very short term channel trends.
4.1.1 Existing Key Generation Algorithms: CIR Level Crossing
In this section, the algorithm presented in [2] is summarized. First, a probing phase is
entered where the channel between two radios is sampled using probing packets. This is
accomplished through sending a known probing signal between the two nodes of interest and
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comparing the received signal to the known transmitted signal. This process is illustrated
in Fig. 4.1 and its output is visualized in Fig. 4.2.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of channel probing
These probes are assembled at both ends of the link and, once enough probes are ex-
changed, each node independently filters the estimated channel using the maximum of the
CIR to reduce the presence of large scale shadow fading. The filtered version of the channel
presented in Fig. 4.2 can be seen in Fig. 4.3.
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Figure 4.2: Channel estimates (peak magnitude of the CIR) at one end of the channel
Figure 4.3: Filtered channel estimates (peak magnitude of the CIR) at one end of the channel
After filtering, the nodes compute the standard deviation of the channel to use as a
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threshold to determine if the sample at each time index is a 1, 0, or should not be considered
as a bit. These thresholds are referred to as q+ and q− for quantizing a 1 or 0, respectively.
The filtered channels from each radio along with lines representing quantizer steps can be
seen in Fig. 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Filtered channel estimates (peak magnitude of the CIR) from both nodes overlaid
with zoom in for clarity.
Next, a window is applied to the parsed bits, and a bit is considered to be present at
both radios if there is a run of M same bits in a row. Runs of estimates meeting this
requirement are displayed in Fig. 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Quantized channel estimate runs on zoomed in segment from Fig. 4.4.
Finally, one radio sends the indices where it believes there is a bit to the other radio,
and the other radio replies with a list of indices that it agrees contain a useful bit. Any
eavesdropper would only have information about what samples are being used as bits, but
not what bit the samples were parsed to due to the diversity of wireless channels. As the
wireless channel is reciprocal only between the two cooperating radios due to the principle
of diversity of wireless channels, the eavesdropper would not parse the same bits, therefore
leaving them with a useless key.
4.1.2 Existing Key Generation Algorithms: Localized CSI Trends
In this section, the algorithm presented in [3] is summarized. Much like the previous tech-
nique, a channel probing phase is entered first. In this algorithm, the known signal is taken
to be an OFDM frame such as the preambles used in the 802.11 standards. After probing,
some filtering can be applied to help remove noise induced by the sampling equipment as
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well as slow fading effects on the samples. Next, each probe is compared with the next
probe by subcarrier, representing the CSI of the frame. This idea is illustrated between two
sets of subcarrier estimates in Fig. 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Comparison between two successive sets of subcarrier estimates (CSI).
By examining the CSI of these frames, the state of each narrow band subcarrier can be
observed. Over short periods, the magnitude of the narrow band channels follow increasing
or decreasing trends. These short term trends can be quantized into bits by comparing
the changes between individual probes. These changes can be considered a 1 if there is
an increase in magnitude, or a 0 if there is a decrease in magnitude. In order to ensure
matching bits between nodes, the most common bit seen over multiple probes can be taken
as the final bit. This idea is illustrated across multiple estimates of one subcarrier in Fig.
4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison between multiple estimates (CSI) of one subcarrier.
4.2 System Description
Now that a framework for sampling APP layer traffic has been established in section 3.2,
the technique can be used to integrate the key generation algorithm into the MAC layer
of a radio system with minimal overhead. This integrated technique is based on the level-
crossing algorithm described in section 4.1.1. This base algorithm was selected since it has
been thoroughly vetted and is well known. In addition, this algorithm exhibits a low s-bit
error rate, which is important for encryption reliability. First, when two radios decide to
generate a key, the interrupt timer must be set on both receivers. In order to make sure the
interrupts have a minimal time offset, a synchronization handshake should be introduced.
This synchronization could take the form of a dedicated packet or ride on existing signaling
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packets. A return packet is sent either declining to enter into key generation, or accepting
while also serving as a signal to start the interrupt timer.
Next, during periods with a bidirectional stream of APP layer packets, both partic-
ipating radios collect packet samples. As packet samples are collected, constant packet
components, such as preambles, are used to generate channel state information. Once a
predetermined number of packets are collected, the participants suspend collection to begin
processing. The CSI from the collected samples is then processed following the algorithm
summarized in section 4.1.1 during periods of slow traffic in order to maintain overall system
performance. As the selected symmetric key generation algorithm requires bit indexes to
be exchanged between nodes, a new packet may be introduced or an existing data packet
can be modified to carry the algorithm information. If a different key generation algorithm
is used, such as the one outlined in section 4.1.2, the use of a data exchange packet becomes
unnecessary.
Once a key is established, it can be given to the APP layer to be used for high level
encryption activities or, preferably, used to encrypt outgoing data within the radio stack as
a supplement or replacement for existing security functions. A packet flow diagram showing
how packets might flow through the MAC layer of a radio can be seen in Fig. 4.8.
The keys can be used directly and can be continually changed by generating new bits
to add to the end of the existing key, but it is more likely that the keys will be used to seed
a pseudo-random number generator in order to fully change the key used between every
packet. Key mismatches can be determined through the sending of known packets, such as
management frames. If the keys at each radio turn out to be mismatched, the process can be
started over or the key can be reverted. Additionally, when a participating radio recognizes
4. REAL-TIME KEY GENERATION SYSTEM 27
that it is not sending or receiving enough traffic in order to maintain symmetric sampling,
it should suspend the key generation process. This can be accomplished through either a
management packet, or observation of traffic flows directly to keep additional overhead to
a minimum.
Algorithm 1 shows a pseudocode implementation of this online key generation process.
The pseudocode does not include signaling packets, but assumes that the process begins as
soon as the radio is turned on.
Figure 4.8: Illustration of packet flow in the real-time system
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Algorithm 1 Real-Time Sampling Algorithm
1: global pktSample . / keep track of if a sample is needed and how many are needed
2: global numSamples . / keep track of how many samples have been collected
3: static maxNumSamples . / number of samples needed to generate a key
4:
5: procedure onSampleInterrupt




10: if packetIsGood && pktSample > 0 then
11: if pktSample > 2 then
12: suspend sample collection
13: else if numSamples > maxNumSamples then
14: parse key from stored samples using level crossing algorithm
15: else
16: store channel sample from packet
17: pktSample– . /update need for a new sample
18: end if
19: end if




. / Initialize transmit and receive along with standard MAC processing
24: init sampleInterrupt . / Initialize the interrupt timer
25: while 1 do
26: . / Wait for packet TX or RX
27: end while
28: end procedure
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4.3 Case Study: Integration into IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard offers a widely adopted and well defined radio system for po-
tential channel based encryption key generation. The proposed real-time key generation
system could be implemented in both software with firmware and driver updates to com-
mercial equipment and in hardware in future equipment which would provide greater speed.
In order to incorporate potentially new packet types, such as a handshake series for
the start of key generation, an index exchange, and a key generation suspension packet,
reserved frame subtypes can be utilized. Section 8.2.4.1.3, table 8-1 in the 802.11-2012
standard offers a list of frame identifiers, including subtypes reserved for future use [10].
Necessary key generation supporting packet types could utilize reserved space as no changes
to general frame structure are needed to convey the necessary information. Using these
reserved parameters without any major frame changes can be implemented with updates
to existing hardware.
In addition to the extensible packet types offered by 802.11, as described in section 18.3
of the 802.11-2012 standard, a Physical Layer Convergence Procedure (PLCP) is included in
every OFDM frame to facilitate frame alignment and offset synchronization and corrections.
Part of the PLCP is a Long Training Symbol (LTS) as described in 802.11-2012 sections
18.3.3 and L.1.3.2 with the purpose of providing fine frequency correction as well as channel
estimation. The LTS is comprised of 52 subcarriers with an alternating phase of 0◦ and
180◦ with unity magnitude and zero magnitude at the DC subcarrier.
CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
This chapter provides details about the experimental validation that was performed to
test the ideas presented in the preceding chapters. First, the experimental hardware is
described in addition to the standard compliant framework that was chosen for experimen-
tation. Next, the testing on the sampling technique that was described in section 3.2 will
be detailed. Finally, the testing on the real-time system that was outlined in chapter 4
will be discussed along with preliminary statistical randomness testing. All results will be
presented in chapter 6.
5.1 Experimental Setup
In order to further investigate the procedures described in chapter 4 and section 3.2, it
was decided that a Software Defined Radio (SDR) would be the most versatile tool to
enable implementation and rapid revision. The Mango Communications Wireless Open-
Access Research Platform (WARP) v3 kit [29] was selected due to its wide usage in wireless
communications research as well as its selection of proven and supported reference design
for relatively quick integration.
The WARPv3 board includes Xilinx Virtex-6 Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
for custom radio implementation, two transceiver chains operating in the 2.4 GHz and 5
GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical Radio Band (ISM) with 40 MHz RF bandwidth
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and 12-bit A/D and D/A chips. In addition, the radio boards include two gigabit Ethernet
interfaces for application layer data transfer and radio logging and control. The radio boards
contain 2 GB of DDR3 memory that is crucial for channel sample storage, which, depending
on how many samples are stored at a time, can take more space than FPGA memory can
provide.
In order to try these real-time designs in real-world systems, the 802.11-2012 standard
was chosen as the natural test radio system. As part of their WARPv3 kit, Mango Com-
munications offers a real-time, standards compliant, 802.11 reference design [30] which was
chosen as the reference design for the implementation of APP layer sampling and real-time
encryption key generation.
The WARP 802.11 reference design is a real time, FPGA based implementation of the
IEEE 802.11-2012 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) MAC layer and OFDM PHY
layer. The PHY layer is implemented directly on the FPGA using Mango created IP cores.
It fully supports ACK as well as request-to-send and clear-to-send functionality, along with
OFDM transmitter and receiver chains as outlined in section 18 of the standard, and Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) receive capabilities as specified in section 16.2 of the
standard to support legacy functions.
The MAC layer is implemented between two MicroBlaze softcores on the FPGA: a lower
level MAC core for controlling time critical functions, such as medium access, and a higher
level MAC core for less time critical applications, such as station associations and Ethernet
data encapsulation. Most of the functionality specified in standard section 9.3 relating to
the DCF is implemented, as well as many of the frame types specified in standard section
8.
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Two major phases of evaluation were conducted and are described in the sections to
follow in addition to a discussion of statistical randomness testing.
5.2 Application Layer Sampling
The first set of testing was performed with the goal of verifying that APP layer sampling
could produce reciprocal channels. In order to characterize performance, the time offset
between forward and reverse samples was examined, as was the variance in the offset (de-
scribed using τ , τ ′, and η in section 3.1) in various wireless environments. In addition,
visualizations of the channel in time and frequency were examined in order to verify that
APP layer sampling produced a reciprocal channel.
5.2.1 Channel Estimation
As noted in section 4.3, 802.11 frames contain a PLCP which provides information for coarse
and fine synchronization. In addition, the LTS component of the PLCP can be used for
channel estimation.
The WARP system uses a common least-square estimator to generate channel coeffi-
cients from the LTS of received frames. As given in [31], the cost function minimized by
the estimator is described as
S = (Y −XHˆ)∗(Y −XHˆ) (5.1)
where X and Y are the transmitted and received signals, respectively, hˆ is the channel
estimate, and ∗ is the conjugate transpose operator. Thus, the least-square estimate of the
channel is solved as
Hˆ = (X)−1Y (5.2)
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with k = 0, 1, ...,K − 1 representing each OFDM subcarrier being estimated.
5.2.2 Implementation Notes
In addition to channel estimates in the form of CSI generated as described in equation
5.3, the scheduler functionality of the 802.11 reference design was used in order to time
packet requests. The fine scheduler was used for sampling purposes and had a reported
timing accuracy of ±64 µs. The local traffic generation system built into the design was
used to generate APP layer data packets to send between participating nodes. Finally,
the WARPnet Python experimental framework was used to control experiments as well
as capture logs including sampled packets along with their channel estimates for oﬄine
analysis. The experimental framework provides a low overhead method of capturing system
information about all radios in the network.
Primary testing was carried out between two nodes, an AP, Alice, and an STA, Bob.
Channel samples were taken using the system described in section 3.2, and all data was
sent to a central host computer for processing. In order to test the sampling technique with
various multipath and mobility conditions, a Spirent SR5500 wireless channel emulator was
used. The channel emulator setup can be seen in Fig. 5.1. In addition, the radios were
setup across a lab consisting mostly of office space, as depicted in Fig. 5.2. Results are
discussed in section 6.1.
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Figure 5.1: Channel emulator experimental configuration
Figure 5.2: Over the air experimental configuration
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5.3 Real-Time Encryption Key Generation
The second set of testing was performed with the goal of verifying that symmetric encryp-
tion key generation could occur in real time while maintaining backwards compliance with
standard systems. In order to characterize performance, the s-bit generation rate and error
rate were observed. Additionally, added latency was noted and standards compliance was
verified.
Primary testing was carried out using two nodes, an AP and an STA. Channel samples
were taken using the system described in section 3.2, but for this experiment all processing
was performed on the WARP hardware, either on the FPGA directly or on a MicroBlaze
softcore. The key generation algorithm discussed in section 4 was implemented in the high
level mac with channel estimates stored on the DDR3 memory while waiting for processing.
APP layer traffic was generated using both ping commands and file transfers between
host PCs attached to the AP and STA. In order to facilitate sampling, APP layer data
was sent at a rate such that packets were sent much faster than once per sample window,
nominally 2 Mbps. Two nodes were set up approximately twenty feet apart in a research lab
with mostly office space. Experimentation was carried out over the air on both congested
as well as unoccupied channels. Standard 2.4 GHz monopole antennas were used so as to
resemble a typical consumer wireless network. For the purpose of this test, the sampling
period used was 80 ms as the environment had some motion due to human foot traffic,
but there were no very rapidly changing components. Nodes were spaced in a similar
configuration to that depicted in Fig. 5.2.
Keys were generated using a window over the channel state information derived from
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the preamble of the 802.11 data packets. A total of 80 packets were considered at a time.
This grouping allowed full keys to be generated, even if a bit error occurred during one
segment of the process. If one segment of the key was discovered to be mismatched through
the reception of a non-decodable test packet, the key was reverted by one segment and the
process continued. In addition to practicality, this operation mirrors the possible use case
of changing a key over time. Success was measured by bit error rate as well as raw bit
generation speed.
Standards compliance was spot-checked though the use of a commercial WiFi device.
A mobile phone was attached to the modified AP and the internet was accessed in vari-
ous configurations. Spot-checking occurred while key generation was in progress with the
modified STA and while the modified STA was not connected to the modified AP.
5.4 Key Randomness
As the intended use of the keys generated using this system is data encryption, it is impera-
tive that the keys are sufficiently random. Typically, keys generated using wireless channels
are considered theoretically random as the underlying processes that the keys are parsed
from, such as the traditional Rayleigh fading channel, are known to be random [22], [23],
[32].
Concerns about non-randomness stem from the algorithms used to parse bits from chan-
nel samples. These algorithms may unintentionally (or intentionally) introduce defects in
the keys. Confidence in key randomness is commonly gained by passing large amounts of
generated bits through a battery of statistical tests to search for defects such as frequent
runs of the same bit, repeating patterns in the bits, and non-uniform distributions of bit
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values. Here, a tool published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology [33]
was used to check for statistical defects as it is considered the industry standard test suite.
This method was chosen as it was used for the original randomness verification of the al-
gorithm chosen for the real-time system [2]. As suggested in [34], six tests were chosen:
block frequency, longest run of ones in a block, spectral, non-overlapping template match-
ing, serial, and cumulative sums. These tests were chosen as they focus on the distribution
of ones and zeros within the key and the detection of pattern defects, but are different from
the tests chosen in [2] because there were many more bits available for statistical testing in
that work. A detailed explanation of the tests can be found in [33].
As a large number of bits are needed to check for statistical defects, keys used for this
testing were generated using channel samples collected by the APP layer sampling system
while the keys were generated from the samples using oﬄine processing to maximize key
length and minimize error rate. This was necessary as approximately 106 bits were needed
for basic analysis so bit generation had to occur as fast as possible.
CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The experiments outlined in chapter 5 were carried out and results are discussed here. First,
the described sampling technique is characterized in order to gain confidence that reciprocal
channels can be generated. Next, the real-time system implementation is tested in order to
determine if it is a viable path forward for future experimentation and standards integration
for physical layer key generation. Finally, key randomness is investigated to ensure that the
keys generated using this system are useful for encryption purposes.
6.1 Application Layer Sampling
Ten tests were conducted to evaluate the effects of multiple paths, low levels of Doppler
shift, and packet generation rate on the reliability of APP layer sampling. The final test
was performed over the air in an office environment. The nodes were approximately forty
feet apart and did not have line of sight between their antennas. Samples were collected
using an unoccupied wireless channel. The setup parameters of each test are described in
table 6.1. In each case, the sample period was set at 10 ms and statistics are calculated
from 48,000 sampled packets captured over four trials per test parameter set.
The first metric of interest is how consistently samples were grabbed at the requested
interval. A comparison of the sampling interval for each of the parameter sets can be seen
in table 6.2.
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Table 6.1: Summary of test parameters used to evaluate APP layer sampling system
Test Case Channel Num Paths Doppler (Hz) Packet Gen. Rate (ms)
1 static 1 - 5.0
2 static 1 - 2.0
3 Rayleigh 1 4.25 5.0
4 Rayleigh 1 4.25 2.0
5 Rayleigh 1 8.27 5.0
6 Rayleigh 1 8.27 2.0
7 Rayleigh 3 4.25 5.0
8 Rayleigh 3 4.25 2.0
9 Over the Air - - 5.0
10 Over the Air - - 2.0
Table 6.2: Comparison of estimate period for each test parameter set
Test Case 1 2 3 4 5
Mean Est Period (ms) 9.98 10.01 9.99 10.01 9.99
Std. Dev. (ms) 0.38 5.46 0.38 5.71 0.52
Test Case 6 7 8 9 10
Mean Est Period (ms) 10.01 9.99 10.01 10.01 10.07
Std. Dev. (ms) 5.20 0.47 5.65 2.99 10.80
Right away, it is apparent that using an APP layer packet generation rate of 2.0 ms
does not work well in this implementation. This is most likely due to a combination of too
much strain on the 802.11 reference design along with problems with one radio becoming
dominant in the channel by flooding it with packets before the other could respond.
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While the deviation in the sampling period does seem to increase as expected for higher
levels of Doppler and high orders of multipath, all sets of parameters have an average
sampling period of 10 ms, which was the requested rate. Over the air test ten (2.0 ms
packet generation rate) can be considered encouraging as the average sample period was
close to 10 ms and the majority of the samples were within 20 ms, which is well within one
channel coherence window for the test case. In the case of a 5.0 ms packet generation rate
(over the air test nine), the deviation in sample period is minimal, ensuring the estimates
are within one coherence window.
The second major measure of interest is the delay between forward and reverse channel
estimation, represented by τ ′ in equation 3.3. A comparison of the sampling delay for each
of the parameter sets can be found in table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Comparison of sampling delay between the forward and reverse samples
Test Case 1 2 3 4 5
Mean Delay (ms) 11.69 250.69 13.61 202.30 14.57
Std. Dev. (ms) 1.51 32.82 3.24 59.72 2.44
Test Case 6 7 8 9 10
Mean Delay (ms) 196.85 12.61 171.90 8.28 13.11
Std. Dev. (ms) 51.44 2.28 30.66 5.90 41.27
Again, the trials conducted with a packet generation period of 2.0 ms exhibit unexpected
behavior. As they show such a high sampling offset, well over a channel coherence window,
they would not be useful for observing reciprocity in the channel. The large offset may
confirm that the packets may be colliding at a higher than usual rate, or it may indicate
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that the hardware cannot support such a fast bi-directional packet stream.
On the contrary, the trials conducted with a packet generation period of 5.0 ms per-
formed as expected with each one averaging an offset of less than 15.0 ms. The air channel
performance was reasonable, with the high deviation most likely caused by packet loss due
to weak signal strength as a result of the non line of sight setup as opposed to transceiver
overloading. This performance is fast enough to observe reciprocity for slowly varying
channels, i.e. channels seen in an office environment but not necessarily channels seen in
vehicular communications.
In order to gain confidence in the capture of channel reciprocity using the APP layer
technique, CSI representing the channel coefficients for each utilized subcarrier in the 802.11
LTS along with phase estimates were viewed for a selection of sample pairs. An example
can be seen in Fig. 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Comparison of subcarrier estimates between forward and reverse samples
As can be seen in the magnitude plot, the subcarrier magnitudes follow the same trend
at both ends of the channel. This helps demonstrate that the channels are sampled so as
to preserve reciprocity. It is acceptable that the magnitudes at each end are different by a
scalar value as the presented physical layer key generation algorithms are interested in short
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term channel trends, not absolute values. The magnitudes will almost always have some
offset due to transceiver differences unless some explicit calibration procedure is undertaken.
While not as close as the magnitudes, the channel phase estimates are acceptable as they
follow a similar rate of change over the subcarriers. The actual value of the phase will almost
never be the same because noise added by the transceivers through frequency mismatches
add offsets to the phase. In addition, the phase of a channel is generally accepted to vary
faster than the magnitude of the channel [1].
Finally, the time domain CIR peak magnitude was compared at both radios by overlaying
the two sets of estimates. A short window of the overlay can be found in Fig. 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of CIR peak magnitude estimates for forward and reverse samples
It is apparent that the estimates follow the same general trend, even without any cor-
rective filtering applied. This is significant as it confirms that the APP layer sampling
technique can capture reciprocity in the wireless channel which is necessary in order to per-
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form symmetric key generation. A final indication of reciprocity comes from the correlation
of the two sets of channel estimates, which for these over the air samples is represented as a
Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.57 which is generally accepted to represent a correlation
in the data.
6.2 Real-Time Encryption Key Generation
Real-time system testing results are summarized in Table 6.4 as a benchmark of first gen-
eration system performance.
Table 6.4: Summary of experimental results using modified WARP system
Experiment duration 20 min
Interrupt timer 80 msec
Average s-bit rate 0.63 s-bits/sec
Average bit-error rate 6.7%
Overall, the channel-based key generator added into the WARP 802.11 reference im-
plementation generated symmetric bits with a secret bit rate of 0.63 s-bits/sec and with
an average bit error rate of 6.7%. While this error rate seems low, a single bit mismatch
renders the entire key segment useless. As a result, the overall segment mismatch rate
was close to 33.3% with the average segment containing five bits generated from 80 packet
samples. This statistic means that for a complete key of 128 bits, 35 key segments had
to be generated on average with 10 of the segments discarded due to the presence of a bit
error. While the bit generation rate of this system is lower than research implementations
[35], [25], this may be acceptable as this algorithm can continually run without introducing
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the overhead required for dedicated probing packets, so long as sufficient APP layer traffic
is moving across the network.
Some processing overhead was introduced to the WARP 802.11 MAC as a result of
running the algorithm. Round-trip latency for APP layer traffic was increased from an
average of 0.85 ms to 1.21 ms, representing a 42.4% increase. This increase can be largely
attributed to the processing necessary to extract keys from the channel state information.
The algorithm was run on the same MicroBlaze processing core used for MAC high functions
on the WARP 802.11 reference as opposed to an isolated processing environment. No
change in effective data throughput was observed after the introduction of the key extraction
algorithm to the WARP 802.11 reference.
In the current implementation, this technique seems to be best suited for augmenting
WPA2 or similar processes. A sample use case could involve starting with a passphrase
and then using this algorithm to change the key over time in a random fashion. This
process can be equated to using the WPA2 passphrase as a means of authentication and
initial encryption, and then shifting the encryption responsibilities over to the physical layer
security algorithm. This technique also has potential to augment standards like HTTPS in
unsecured networks. Even in places where the 802.11 network is unsecured, this method
can be used to secure individual user connections and can generate enough bits to make
keys from scratch. A slower key generation rate could be traded for lower bit error rate to
ensure that fully symmetric keys are generated on the first try.
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6.3 Key Randomness
Key randomness statistical test results can be found in Table 6.5. These results were
generated using 106 bits and are reported as a P-value where P > 0.01 indicates sequence
randomness. The P-values are calculated by the test suite differently for each test and are
a measure of confidence that the sequence is random based on the test results. Channel
data from APP layer sampling test scenario nine was used to generate symmetric keys using
oﬄine processing. Test scenario nine was chosen as it showed the best over the air results
and oﬄine processing was used in order to maximize s-bit generation rate.








These results provide the impetus to continue development of this real-time system
into a mature commercial implementation. While the results are encouraging because each
selected test passed, they are only the start of randomness testing as the tests must be
repeated using millions of bits in various environments in order to gain confidence that the
keys are sufficiently random. Future systems must be reevaluated for randomness as imple-
mentation decisions may add an unintentional bias to the keys. All real-time key generation
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algorithm implementations should be tested for statistical defects. More complete testing
may be acomplished by following the procedure outlined in [34].
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this work was to help begin the transition of physical layer security tech-
niques from theoretical constructs and purpose-built systems to widely accepted standards
and commercial equipment. Specifically, this work focused on the generation of encryption
keys using the physical wireless channel between two radios. The major challenges faced
were: 1. how to sample the wireless channel in a manner retaining reciprocity without
introducing heavy overhead and 2. how to accomplish generating encryption keys from the
wireless channel between two radios within the framework provided by existing standards.
These hurdles were overcome through the establishment of a method to sample the wireless
channel using data generated at the application layer. This technique was then incorporated
into a real-time encryption key generation system design based on the widely adopted IEEE
802.11 standard. Finally, initial experimental validation was performed on these systems to
establish their viability for continued development.
Through experimental verification, it was demonstrated that despite the timing variance
incurred as a result of using APP layer data traffic to estimate wireless channels, estimate
reciprocity can be achieved. Further, the reciprocity is enough to generate symmetric en-
cryption keys in a real-time processing system implemented on a SDR running a standards
compliant radio MAC and PHY design. Encouraging results from statistical testing pro-
vided confidence that the keys generated through these systems are indeed random.
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7.1 Recommendations for Future Work
While this system has shown that it is possible to generate PHY layer encryption keys in a
standards compliant environment using application layer traffic, more work has to be per-
formed to determine the optimal sampling speed and algorithm confidence parameters. This
should include a characterization of how various delay spreads and scattering environments
influence key randomness to ensure cryptographic soundness. Real-time channel coherence
time estimation, similar to what is discussed in [36], should be investigated in order to dy-
namically alter algorithm parameters to ensure key randomness and generation rates. Key
mutual information between active key generation participants and eavesdroppers must be
evaluated to understand the advantage held by an eavesdropper. Finally, future system
testing will need to be conducted in a variety of measured and emulated environments to
quantify key error rates and randomness in different situations.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy
IV Initialization Vector
WPA WiFi Protected Access
WPA2 WiFi Protected Access Second Generation
RC4 Rivest Cipher 4
AES Advanced Encryption Standard






CSI Channel State Information
CIR Channel Impulse Response
s-bit Secret Bit - Usually referring to bits generated for encryption usage
OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
APP Application - Usually referring to the Application Layer of a system
PHY Physical - Usually referring to the Physical Layer of a system
MAC Media Access Control
ACK Acknowledgment
PLCP Physical Layer Convergence Procedure
LTS Long Training Symbol
WARP Wireless Open-Access Research Platform
SDR Software Defined Radio
ISM Industrial, Scientific and Medical Radio Band
FPGA Field-Programmable Gate Array
DCF Distributed Coordination Function - Usually referring to the MAC scheme of the
IEEE 802.11 standard
LIST OF VARIABLES
H Complex transfer function representing a wireless channel
t Continuous time
h Magnitude of H at time t
θ Phase of H at time t
η Random noise process, typically Gaussian
x Transmitted signal
y Received signal
hˆ Estimated magnitude of H
n Discrete time sample
N Total number of samples
T Sample period for discretization
τ Constant time offset between forward and reverse channel samples
τ ′ Random time offset between forward nd reverse channel samples
q Bit quantization threshold
M Run of the same bits
Y Frequency domain received signal
X Frequency domain transmitted signal
Hˆ Frequency domain channel estimate
k OFDM Subcarrier index
K Total number of subcarriers
Yk Received subcarrier k
Xk Transmitted subcarrier k

